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Synthetic Science:
A Response to Rabinow
David S. Caudill

Abstract. Rabinow’s description of the unique collaborative goal of synthetic biology at Berkeley,
to foster a coproduction among multiple disciplines and perspectives from the outset (as opposed to
downstream reflection upon ethical, legal, and social implications), is somewhat misleading. While
that particular assemblage is represented as coproductive, the inevitability of science as a coproduction
is eclipsed. That shortcoming may well be a strategic compromise to ensure effective collaboration, but
it could backfire. Idealized images of science, which might be termed synthetic or artificial, have had
adverse consequences in legal and administrative assessments of reliable science.
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I. I NTRODUCTION

“Mistrust of language” is a reluctance to see all that is involved in using it well,
[as well as a] reluctance to see what kind of failure it may be to use it badly.1

The notion of multidisciplinary collaboration, particularly when it involves
the inclusion of insights associated with the humanities within the practices of
a seemingly technical discipline, is familiar to those in law and literature studies. Of course, the reflections of literary critics or theorists upon legal processes
and institutions could be viewed as merely after-the-fact (or “downstream”)
engagement, insofar as there appears to be little daily collaboration between
literary scholars, on the one hand, and attorneys, judges, or legislators, on
the other. But in law school training, law and literature courses (or literary
segments of other courses, such as legal ethics) represent multidisciplinary
Law & Literature, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp. –. issn 1535-685x, electronic issn 1541-2601. © 2009 by The
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525 /lal.2009.21.3.

43 1

LAL2103_09.indd 431

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1495817

10/19/09 4:16:46 PM

L a w & L i t e r a t u r e • Vo l u m e 2 1 , N u m b e r 3

collaborations, whether to enrich textual analysis (of judicial opinions, statutes, or the U.S. Constitution), to enhance ethical criticism of the profession
(by reference to literary representations of law and lawyers), or variously to
inculcate empathy, encourage the withholding of judgment, or develop a sense
of justice. The latter goals have a parallel in medical school training, where
literature and medicine are combined to “strengthen and support the compassionate instincts of doctors.”2 An even better example of multidisciplinary
collaboration in the medical field might be the proliferation of ethicists and
philosophers (or “biophilosophers”) on hospital staffs; while “they generally
refrain from making decisions,” resolutions “often emerge from the process
of analyzing the medical information, improving communication between the
parties and suggesting various principles to consider.”3
An important aspect of the foregoing examples of multidisciplinary collaboration is the tacit acknowledgement that the “humanity,” whether literature
or ethical philosophy, is not a dispensable add-on to an otherwise humanityfree zone of practice, but rather that the technical practices of law and medicine, respectively, are already literary and ethical prior to their welcoming
of collaborators from the humanities. Law and medicine, however, are easy
cases, and it is perhaps less clear that synthetic biology, in the absence of collaborators, is already an ethical, social, political, and rhetorical enterprise.
Hence the collaborative goal of Thrust 4 in the SynBERC initiative, to foster
“a co-production among disciplines and perspectives from the outset,”4 is a
bit misleading—while its particular, transparent assemblage is represented as
coproductive, the inevitability of science as a coproduction is eclipsed.

I I . S y nt h e tic B io l o g y I n t h e O p e n

Although the practice of invention and rectification is familiar, scientists don’t
spend their time in meta-reflections or “second order” observations about their
own activities.5

In contemporary narratives concerning scientific misconduct, apart from
concerns about isolated individuals with base motives and about institutional
failures (to police misconduct, and to encourage collaboration and whistleblowing), concerns about “the practice of modern science itself ” are evident.6
While “scientific laboratories develop distinct cultural, social, and technical
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stances,” and while “mistaken ideas, badly designed experiments, or incorrect
calculations” are part of science, these remain hidden:
[D]epictions of science in the media and in scientific literature present a reconstruction of . . . research [as] carefully thought out, planned and executed
according to a neat and rigorous process.7

As to misconduct, the argument goes, it takes a lot of effort to sanitize the presentation—investigators “nudge certain facts out of the picture, defuse them
with an ad hoc hypothesis, or . . . ignore them” so that the data is “smoothed,
massaged, re-organized, and then filtered before publication.”8 Moreover, the
pressure to publish coerces scientists to produce results, even as the “values
behind scientific research may have slowly shifted to favor commercialization
and profits over knowledge and ethical behavior.”9
Such warnings echo the public’s fear of science encouraged by, or reflected
in, traditional images of hubristic and amoral scientists in Western literature and
mid-twentieth-century cinema. Indeed, modern scientists “have continued to
provide writers and film-makers with ongoing instances of the [mad chemist or]
alchemist stereotype,” with their ruthless determination and failure “to show
concern about the social and moral impact of their research.”10 Mary Shelley’s
Dr. Frankenstein exemplifies the ambitious investigator of the secrets of divine
creation, committing “the sin of hubris with disastrous results.”11
The parallel with synthetic biology is not lost. “Some critics consider the
idea of creating artificial organisms in the laboratory to be a frightening example of scientific hubris, evocative of Faust or Dr. Frankenstein.”12 In less literary terms, synthetic biology provokes “fears about scientists ‘playing god’
and raises deeper philosophical and religious concerns about the nature of
life itself and the process of creation.”13 Cambridge philosopher Peter Lipton
highlights the “fear of monsters” throughout history—“the sense that something that violates species boundaries is monstrous”—and thinks that
people have an understandable worry that this technology is scary because it is
an example of us playing God. . . . God has an edge here, because God is . . .
omniscient, and we unfortunately are not. . . . I think that’s a very reasonable
concern.14

In another formulation, the public wants scientists to “realize that we may be
creating life forms that God and/or evolution never dared.”15
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Resistance to synthetic biology in terms of hubris is, however, somewhat
unique and ideologically interesting. In a recent study of cultural cognition
and the perceived risks of synthetic biology, the authors detected a reversal
of the general tendency of (i) those holding egalitarian values to be more
risk-sensitive (e.g., with respect to global warming or nuclear power) and (ii)
those holding hierarchical, religious, or conservative values to be more riskskeptical (i.e., less likely to challenge societal and governmental elites).16
Synthetic biology . . . seems to be attended by a different constellation of meanings that are themselves symbolically threatening to hierarchs. Like evolution, . . . synthetic biology . . . seems to denigrate a set of cultural understandings that subordinate man to the authority of God [which] is in turn subversive
to the authority of certain institutions and norms traditionally integral to a hierarchical social ordering.17

The cultural conflict over synthetic biology, associated with secularism and
perceived as subversive, will therefore likely differ “from conflict over other
environmental and technological risks.”18
The environmental and technological risks associated with synthetic
biology have been catalogued as including (i) accidental or uncontrolled
release of synthetic organisms; (ii) bioterrorism, including biohacking or
“garage biology” as well as state-level biological warfare programs; and
(iii) patents and monopolies that restrict collaboration and stifle progress.19
To mitigate those risks, numerous commentators have recommended an
early policy response; suggestions include (i) a regulatory regime to screen
oligonucleotide (short strands of synthetic DNA) orders for pathogenic
DNA sequences, (ii) governmental oversight of “dual-use” (i.e., useful for
beneficial or military ends) technologies, (iii) ecological modeling of synthetic microorganisms, and (iv) a code of ethics for biological engineering,
including physical-isolation measures and biological isolation (e.g., creating systems that cannot function in the wild)20—the latter two suggestions
exemplify self-regulation within the field. In contrast to other scientific
fields where anticipation and assessment of risk are less difficult, practitioners of synthetic biology will likely need to join with “biosafety experts,
social scientists, ethicists, and legal scholars to brainstorm about reasonable
approaches for the oversight and control of [their] research.”21 Consensus is
also growing that the scientific community should take the lead “in debating
the implications of their research and engaging with broader society around
434
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the issues raised by synthetic biology”—public legitimacy and support will
be needed.22
Because of the potential for intense controversy surrounding synthetic biology,
public outreach and education are needed even at this early stage in the field’s
development. . . . [Participation by scientists] in a public discussion of their
work and its implications for society . . . should be encouraged because [it generates] good will and may help to prevent a future political backlash that could
cripple the emerging field of synthetic biology.23

Such statements highlight the role of rhetoric on the part of scientists in the
public understanding of science.
I I I . R HE T O R I C A L C O N T O U R S

A student-written feature article on synthetic biology, with whatever limitations that may imply, unwittingly paints Rabinow as synthetic biology’s public relations expert. Rabinow, observing that “[m]ost people think this stuff is
dangerous,” suggests that focusing on world health issues would “improve
public perception.”24 “Monsanto was spectacularly stupid and arrogant” in
their public presentation of genetically engineered plants, Rabinow explains,
“focusing on the artificiality of genetically modified crops [instead of] on the
universality of the DNA language that makes such manipulations possible.”25
Companies improving milk production should avoid being “perceived as
big corporate science hammering the last nail in the coffin of struggling milk
farmers” by instead developing “cheap medicines to combat infectious diseases in countries where [that] technology is not available.”26 And as to safety,
“certain risks must be taken”; Rabinow
argues that we cannot foresee all the possible risks associated with a new discipline. . . . The attitude that all possible precautions must be taken is untenable—we can’t possibly know all the ramifications of any given technology,
and we just need to learn to accept that fact.27

As to public concerns over the artificial or unnatural creations of synthetic
biology, Rabinow reflects, think Alice Waters of Chez Panisse—“we can celebrate the triumph of human ingenuity and serendipity that brought” us her
radically unique culinary “concoctions.”28
435
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The foregoing representation of Rabinow seems unfair, but Rabinow concluded his otherwise sophisticated closing plenary of the First Conference
on Synthetic Biology (MIT, June 12, 2004) with a series of aphorisms that
started out vaguely philosophical (“The issue of what gets to be named ethics is a question of power and rhetorical skills”) but ended up somewhat
banal:
1. “[M]embers of your community will need . . . to develop skills and
networks.”
2. “There needs to be much better defense of scientific and technical understanding. Everything is now cast as ‘good for something else’ . . . we
need a better statement of ‘science as a vocation’. . . .”
3. “Make the shift from risk/security to risk/danger. The rhetoric of danger is everywhere. This is based on fear. Replace fear with prudence,
pleasure, and wonder.”
4. “Talk more about how natural it is to be transformative.”29
Rabinow is, of course, not alone in his rhetorical concerns. Some say
“the first step to reassure the public about synthetic biology is to cool the
rhetoric”—because “unrealistic claims” lead to “public uneasiness,” there
“should be a bit more modesty.”30 “High expectations of both the promise and
threat,” therefore, should be tempered by a realistic sense of “the difficulties
in creating new biotechnologies.”31 Rabinow, however, recognizes that some
degree of “hype” is necessary:
[P]latitudes and clichés should be seen as attempts to fix reference points for
debates and communication. They are part of sociologically essential hype
that prognosticative observers of science and society can now not operate
without.32

Sarah Franklin, also an anthropologist, likewise acknowledges that scientific
narratives
rely upon a very standardized form of story-telling with a rather limited set of
starting points, metaphors, plot lines. . . . Scientists need stories to support their
work—stories they tell to funding bodies, governments, venture capitalists and
the general public. . . . [T]hese stories are often deliberately inflated, they’re
designed to fuel expectations.33
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Moreover, the debate surrounding synthetic biology invokes a “narrow
range of clichés and stereotypes”—Frankenstein, science out of control, unknowable risks, dangerous uncertainties.34 Franklin is concerned, however,
that such an “impoverished vocabulary,” such a “limited genre of debate,”
will not lead to a “constructive conversation about what kind of science we
need, how it will be governed, or who would have a place at the table.”35
For example, reproducing the inflationary narratives of the vast scale (“incomprehensible and beyond our ability to imagine”) and fast pace (“racing
ahead, leaving society behind”) of scientific change calls forth a “monotonous” response to contain synthetic biology.36 While the paradox of social
technology (“a very powerful equation”) is unavoidable—“social hope
that fuels much technological innovation . . . exists in constant tension with
the demand for the enforcement of strict limits to scientific innovation”—a
more useful dialogue that begins “with the specific and the localized,” and
that includes multidisciplinary perspectives to break down the science and
society dualism, is needed.37

I V .  P O W E R A N D C O LL A B O R AT I O N

[S]ynthetic biology is following a now well established path in terms of the debates about the social and ethical issues. [As with recombinant DNA,] societal
issues will have a major influence on the funding of science, the types of technologies developed, their application in the real world, how they are ethically
framed and the extent of regulation. . . . [W]e can think of the science, technology, regulatory frameworks and social implications as co-evolving through a
process of mutual shaping.38

Rabinow contrasts the standard collaborative approach—positioning ethicists, legal scholars, and social scientists “downstream” of scientific work—
with “an approach that fosters a co-production among disciplines and pers
pectives from the outset.”39 Naming the fourth SynBERC “Thrust” (following
“Parts,” “Devices,” and “Chassis”) “Human Practices” was meant
to differentiate the goals and strategies of this component from previous attempts to bring “science and society” together into one frame so as to anticipate
and ameliorate science’s “social consequences.”40
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The central, unique concern of Thrust 4 is to critically examine the contributions of synthetic biology (to “medicine, security, energy, and the environment”) “as it develops, not only after it achieves something.”41 Such
collaboration depends on “organizational change” in the “existing conditions” and “work habits” associated with scientific research.42 However, the
habits and dispositions of elite
scientists as well as the organizations of their labs and objects will resist change,
consciously and tacitly. [Many] scientists . . . are willing to cooperate. . . . The
question remains as to whether or not they are willing to contribute to developing collaboration.43

Hence Rabinow’s experiment, to see if knowledge and care – knowledgeable
scientists and “those adjacent to biological work” who care—can mutually
flourish.44
The problems are “the power differentials between the bioscientists and
the human scientists, and the existing disciplinary structures of reward that
shape and reinforce current practices.”45 All of Human Practices’ recursive
rectification, reconfiguration of equipment, pragmatic judgments, and orientation toward a metric of flourishing is set not only against “a certain range of
prior expertise, and prior disciplinary suppositions and ethical commitments,
taken as settled and desirable . . . ,”46 which even the scientists are willing to
change, but also against the
basic inequality between the other [primary investigators] and the Human
Practices’ members [which] operates without examination, bolstered by the
inertia of past dispositions and the larger structures of the university that take
for granted the autonomy of the biosciences as well as their primacy [in the task
of amelioration]. Said straightforwardly: Human Practices is in a dominated
position.47

Nevertheless, Human Practices is an “integral component of the overall enterprise,” positioned “to take up problems in a way that experts-at-a-distance
cannot.”48 Posing questions, rethinking what is at stake, and encouraging both
interfacing with emergent problems and forward thinking—Rabinow’s wager is that these are likely more efficacious from inside the enterprise.
Rabinow confronts the critique that he is complicit “with Power,” forsaking
the opportunities for “exposé or rebuke or denunciation . . . from a position
438
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exterior to the situation.”49 He acknowledges his peril, but reconstruction and
practical judgment require a different mode of survival and engagement, to
keep the “telos of flourishing” from continuing to be marginalized.50

V . A N E W B EG I N N I N G ?

What does it mean to talk about the social implications of synthetic biology? . . .
[We] tend to think of science and social implications . . . as two separate things.
But science studies, for the last three decades, has told us that [we] can never have
a science that’s outside the social. . . . The deceit of the debate about “science and
society” is that the very phrase reproduces the gap between those terms.51

Rabinow’s project diverges from contemporary science studies in two respects. First, he does not engage in ethnography, observational studies, or following scientists around—which is only effective if you are temporarily on the
inside—to reveal the hidden values guiding, or the unacknowledged social,
institutional, and rhetorical aspects of, scientific practice. In becoming a fullfledged member of the team, however, Rabinow does not (entirely) lose his
critical voice, and the potential advantages are numerous in terms of making
a difference in the “real world.” Indeed, Rabinow’s project might be a new
model for science studies—critically examine existing structures, recognize
resistance (and try to overcome it), collaborate to develop ameliorative goals,
and build ethical consensus, all from the inside. Take control of the social,
institutional, and rhetorical reins of the scientific enterprise, and share in its
successes—that would be more power than the anthropologist of science-inaction ever has.
Second, however, Rabinow does not talk or write like a contemporary sociologist of science. That distinction may be part of the needed compromise for
insiders like him, but to say that “previous attempts to bring ‘science and society’ together” are exemplified by those who tried to anticipate and ameliorate
the “social consequences” of science52 is to marginalize decades of science studies scholarship that never saw the “social” as a downstream add-on. Rabinow
knows that, because he defines pedagogy as “development of a disposition to
learn how one’s practices and experiences form or deform one’s existence and
how the sciences . . . enrich or impoverish those dispositions”53—the words
“deform” and “impoverish” suggest the inevitability of values. Indeed, even
439
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collaboration is inevitable in twenty-first-century bioscience—contemporary
scientists “actually have no other option but to be engaged with multiple other
practitioners”—such that the only question is how best to do it, in order to
flourish.54 The effort to “reconfigure and reconstruct” the relations between
the life sciences, the human sciences, and the citizenry55 suggests that those relations are also inevitable. But then to say that for Human Practices, “the basic
rules of what counts as good science and engineering in synthetic biology are
the traditional or standard ones”56 is very strange. To compartmentalize and
stabilize the “rules of good science” seems to deny the social, institutional,
and rhetorical aspects of such “rules.” On the other hand, the “metrics” of
science, whether normalization or dignity or flourishing, are always there,
and can change, and seem to be part of science’s “assemblage.”57 But then
the separation of science and society returns, oddly in terms of “reconstruction,” with a reference to Dewey’s “formulation . . . that science and ethics are
interfaced and assembled in accordance with the demands of ‘progressively
directed inquiry.’”58 This makes reconstruction sound as if social and ethical concerns, previously not interfaced with science, are brought to bear on
synthetic biology. Of course, to seek a science/ethics interface in accordance
with a progressive inquiry does not necessarily mean that no such interface
previously existed (perhaps in accordance with a less-than-progressive inquiry); but why announce the project as “the invention and implementation
of equipment that facilitates forms of work and life,”59 as if the existing equipment does not “facilitate” some forms of work and life? From a science studies
perspective, the oscillation is maddening.
Rabinow’s (and his Human Practices colleagues’) accomplishments, however, if one of the goals of science studies is to reveal the social, institutional,
and rhetorical aspects of science (in the face of scientists’ traditional self-construction of their enterprise as anchored in nature and not cultural conventions), should not be diminished. The proposed interdisciplinary collaboration
in SynBERC (and in other similar synthetic biology initiatives) goes beyond
the dialogue concerning the social and ethical implications (of science) toward an integration of policy and politics, as well as ethics and values, into the
synthetic biology enterprise. Transcending as well the debates over whether
politics taints science, or whether science is inevitably politically biased, the
Human Practices “thrust” openly acknowledges and even celebrates the social
and ethical opportunities of scientific advancement. Neither the institutional
arrangements nor the rhetorical strategies of the science are hidden.
440
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VI. CONCLUS ION

Synthetic biology strives to combine (or synthesize) large amounts of disparate
knowledge. . . . Another, perhaps related meaning [of] “synthetic” . . . is to synthesize new organisms from a set of existing, well-understood components. . . .
[P]erhaps the most exciting and controversial aspect of the name [is] the sense
in which synthetic means artificial[:] synthesizing living systems . . . that . . .
have never existed in nature.60

Rabinow’s modesty with respect to his ambitious project of reconstruction
is apparent: whether elite scientists will actually collaborate with the “human
scientists” is a “genuinely open” question; constructing effectively functioning “equipment” is a challenge; while Dewey’s logic of practical judgments
was “an initial guide to orienting inquiry,” we are left with our own devices;
the “metrics of prosperity and amelioration” may not be sufficient—a “zone
of ambiguity” persists; and as to his dominated position as a human scientist,
there is “no clear answer” as to how to maneuver.61 Criticism of his efforts, in
light of both the challenges he faces and the admirable telos, seems somehow
inappropriate.
But there is something “synthetic,” in the sense of artificial or contrived,
about Rabinow’s account of synthetic biology and its potential. From the
perspective of those who worry about the risks of science out of control, it
is reassuring to know that within the laboratory, the scientific experts are
surrounded by, and conversing with, a team of thoughtful participants who
critically reflect on the goals, values, dangers, and public perception of the
enterprise. That reassurance, however, is communicated alongside a fairly
traditional account of science as independent of culture. In other words, while
the humanities have moved upstream nearly to the source of knowledge, there
is little acknowledgement that the scientists were already, inevitably, engaged
in a social, political, institutional, and ethical enterprise. I am not sure why
Rabinow downplays that aspect of science, although I suspect that he is (i)
well aware of it, and (ii) convinced that it is not only quite beside the point,
but even a potential barrier to collaboration.
Idealized accounts of science, nevertheless, do have consequences, and
their strategic maintenance may backfire. Judges, administrators, and legislators often view “politicized” science as biased, and therefore tend to value
more highly the scientific expert who claims to rise above social preferences,
441
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institutional interests, and rhetorical flair. “Bias, interest, and motivation” are
the markers of junk science for those who idealize science. Human Practices
will, in the idealized perspective, appear as exemplifying such markers. For
that reason alone, I would have liked to have seen “the basic rules of what
counts as good science [—] the traditional or standard ones”62—included, not
bracketed, within the fields of reconstruction and reconfiguration. There is
work to be done on another front, seemingly of little interest to Rabinow,
namely the development of a more pragmatic and less idealistic conception
of science itself.
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